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Abstract
A serious problem with financing labour-managed or employee 
owned firms with standard performance bonds is that workers would 
have an incentive to make investments which do not add to value 
added but which do increase workers utilities. To avoid such 
problems it is necessary to design an asset which bears some of 
the risk which is out of the control of workers, but which makes 
payments which they cannot affect. In this paper such an asset 
is proposed, termed Industry-Average Performance Bonds. Each bond 
pays a fixed share of value added by other firms in the same 
industry. Since the payment depends only on the value added by 
other firms in the same industry, workers have no interest in 
reducing their liability by reducing value added. This asset 
would enable investors to sell insurance against general and 
industry specific risk to labour managed or fully employee owned 
firms. Use of the bonds would mitigate the well-known perverse 
supply responses of such firms by reducing the variance of 
economic rent.
’. Department of Economics, European University Institute, 
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X. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In recent years there has been an enormous expansion of 
partial or full employee ownership of firms in Europe and North 
America. In Europe, the number of employees in fully worker owned 
firms doubled in the late 1970s and early and mid 1980s (Estrin, 
1985), and slower but steady growth has continued since. Some 10 
million employees are now enrolled in employee stock ownership 
plans (ESOPs) in over 10,000 companies in the United States. 
About one-third are expected to be ultimately fully or majority 
employee-owned (GAO, 1987). The increase in these numbers has 
dramatically accelerated in 1988 and 1989.1 Growth of labour- 
managed firms (LMFs), including producer cooperatives, is likely 
to be fueled by higher measured productivity in at least some 
industries (Conte and Svejnar, 1988; Blinder, ed., 1990) . Worker 
ownership is growing dramatically in Eastern Europe, where 
privatization to employees are common.}
Economists have concerns about the wisdom of including 
privatization to employees as a component of economic reform 
(e.g., Lipton and Sachs, 1990). In particular, unsolved dilemmas 
of financing may be constraining further movement in this 
direction. If employee control follows from full or majority (or 
even minority) employee ownership, outside investors will 
presumably be willing to bear any part of the firm's risk only 
at a high premium at best. Without control over management 
directly or through the threat of takeovers, investors might 
reasonably fear that employees will take profits in pay raises 
and avoid paying an adequate return on shares. Currently, fully 




























































































each of which distorts choices about investment and employment. 
They might invest out of their own income, foregoing outside 
funding and keeping the full stream of value added. This requires 
a very high rate of saving, especially for capital intensive 
firms; and in particular, this solution requires that new workers 
buy the firm from current and retired workers by accepting low 
wages or perhaps by making large up-front investments. The 
resulting differentials in net remuneration, while not 
necessarily greater than that found in investor owned firms, 
might damage the morale of this type of firm, undermining its 
sources of organizational comparative advantage. The need to buy 
shares discourages liquidity-constrained (e.g. unemployed) 
workers from joining and in a number of cases in the U.S., this 
has led firms to revert to a conventional structure (e.g., 
purchase by a conventional firm). Alternatively, current workers 
could give shares to new workers. This would discourage 
investment, shorten the planning horizon, and reduce employment. 
This is the second problem, often considered in the LMF 
literature (Vanek, 1970), the difficulty of hiring new workers 
when the value of the workers share in the firm is positive. 
Finally, there is the traditional concern that employees in 
labour-managed firms where nonmember labour is prevented will 
have an incentive to decrease employment when output price rises.
The currently available alternative is for LMFs to issue 
bonds, keeping only some of value added but bearing all of the 
risk. This does not directly require high saving, but the average 
but uneven income stream would require high personal saving as 




























































































zero, eliminating distortions in hiring and investment. 
Unfortunately, the value of such a risky job might be less than 
the value of an ordinary job.
Proposed new forms of funding for labour-managed firms or 
LMFs are designed to make it possible for investors to share the 
risk, without giving workers incentives to cheat investors or 
compromising the essential character of the LMF. The leading 
such proposal is the issue of performance bonds (often termed 
"risk participation bonds") which pay a fixed share of value 
added by the firm. This implies that outside investors and 
worker-owners divide value added in fixed shares. Since they 
receive the same payments, they have similar interests so 
investors could allow workers to manage the firm. The workers 
could reduce their share until their job had a value close to the 
alternative wage, and employ new workers without requiring them 
to pay for their share (s). Retired workers could keep their 
shares or sell them back to the firm (or where permitted) to 
investors to avoid bearing new risk. With such a system, the 
efficient level of employment and investment may obtain (e.g., 
McCain, 1977).
A serious problem with financing with performance bonds is 
that workers would have an incentive to make investments which 
do not add to value added but which do increase workers 
utilities, for example "gold-plated" purchases to make their jobs 
more pleasant, such as fancy offices, luxury furniture in 
factories, and elegant restaurants, or simply to shirk. All 
these are problems for conventional firms as well, but can be 




























































































threat: of takeovers. To avoid such problems it is necessary to 
design an asset which bears some of the risk which is out of the 
control of workers, but which makes payments which they cannot 
affect.
An approach based on the principal/agent and utility 
regulation literatures is to make the payments on the bonds 
depend on the performance of different firms in the same industry 
(Holmstrom, (1979, 1982); Green and Stokey (1983); Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981)) . For example Gibbons and Murphy (1989) has analyzed 
managerial evaluations based on the performance of other managers 
in the principal agent framework (See also Antle and Smith 
(1986)). Shleifer (1985) considered the problem in electric 
utility regulation that marginal cost pricing will damage the 
company's incentive to innovate, and proposes that prices be set 
equal to average marginal costs across a basket of utilities as 
an alternative. Although one does receive a return from the 
"gold-plating" of other utilities, one does not receive a return 
from ones own gold-plating, so that each does not gold-plate so 
long as collusion is excluded.
A general solution is an asset we call Industry-Average 
Performance Bonds. The proposed asset could be implemented even 
if there were a large number of LMFs. Each bond would pay a 
fixed share of value added by other firms in the same industry.5 
It would be bought at the market rate, which would include where 
relevant a default premium. Since the payment would depend only 
on the value added by other firms in the same industry, workers 





























































































This asset would enable investors to sell insurance against 
general and industry-specific risk to LMFs. Of course the workers 
would still bear firm-specific risk, but this is necessary to 
provide incentives for efficiency and to prevent legal 
embezzlement.
If LMFs were financed with the proposed asset and maximized 
the utility of their members they would invest and work at 
efficient levels. If they were exactly as efficient as publicly 
traded firms the net value of the LMFs would be zero so there 
would be no need for workers to buy jobs to avoid distortion of 
employment decisions. If LMFs were more efficient than 
conventional firms, then jobs in LMFs would be valuable. If the 
efficiency gain were proportional to employment, employment 
decisions would still not be distorted even if new employees were 
not required to buy their jobs.
If allowed to do so, LMFs would choose to issue more 
industry performance bonds than they require to finance 
investment and would invest part of the proceeds in regular 
bonds. If there is a risk neutral investor, they can, in effect, 
buy insurance against firm non-specific risk at no cost.* This 
will not reduce the return on industry performance bonds if 
investors anticipate that they will do so. Since the payment 
owed by a given firm does not depend on their investment or value 
added this does not present a moral hazard problem unless firms 
collude.
The following two sections present a simple model which 





























































































Assume a continuum of LMFs indexed by i which ranges from 
0 to 1 . Each produces the same good with the same production 
function given by (1), where q, is the output of firm i, L, is 
(homogeneous) employment in firm i, and K, is the capital used by 
firm i.
(1) Q, = F (L,, K,) .
Variables without subscripts refer to industry totals. The price 
of the good is normalized to 1. The model has two periods. 
Workers have alternative employment opportunities (say in 
conventional, wage-paying firms) of value w. Firm i issues an 
asset which pays a share D, of value added in the industry. 
Investors require an expected return of r so the asset issued by 
firm i sells for D,PQ/(l+r). Note Q has no subscript and refers 
to the industry average. The firm invests this so
(2) K, = D,Q/ (1 + r) .
The workers divide the remainder so each worker receives a share 
given by:
(3) S, = (F (L,, K,) - D,F(K,L))/L, 
plugging (2) into (3) gives




























































































The LMF is assumed to choose D, and L, to maximize S, subject 
to the constraint that S, is greater than or equal to w. This 
maximization is undertaken by a manager, union, some number of 
initial members or other agent, at the start of the period, but 
assuming that the return, S,, is equal for all homogeneous 
employees. This assumption is maintained for simplicity but also 
to make the efficiency problem for the worker-owned firm more 
difficult, since it is well-known that worker-owned firms choose 
employment levels efficiently when allowed to vary the dividend 
share for otherwise equally-ski1led workers depending only on how 
late they arrived in the established firm (Meade, 1986).
It is clear that the LMF will chose D( to fund the optimal 
capital stock without requiring any additional saving from their 
members. The first order condition for D[ is
(5) 0 = F, (L,,K,| F (K, L) / (1 + r) - F (K, L) .
So Fk = (1 + r), just as - it would be for an efficient profit
maximizing firm.
The first order condition for L is given by:
(6) 0 < F, (L,, K,) L, - F(L„K,) + <l + r)K,)/L?
which holds with equality if S, > w. Together, (5) and (6) imply
( 7 )  F,. ( L , , K , ) L,  + F k ( L , , K , ) K ,  = F ( L , , K , )




























































































in the labour-managed firm (Vanek, 1970; Ireland and Law, 1982; 
Smith and Ye, 1988). For if initially producing at any point 
beyond that of constant returns to scale, the dividend could be 
raised by decreasing the number of dividend-accruing employees.
III. Risk Resolved After Employment Decisions Are Made
The advantage of industry performance bonds over ordinary 
bonds is that it enables LMFs to avoid bearing firm non-specific 
risk. This is clearly desirable if there are any investors who 
are willing to bear some of the risk, and in particular if the 
risk is industry-specific and diversifiable. For simplicity we 
will assume that there is a risk neutral investor or equivalently 
that the risk shared by the LMFs in the model is completely 
industry specific and diversifiable. We will also assume that 
workers maximize a mean-variance utility function of income of 
the form in (8) :
(8) V! = E(S,) - g*var < S,)
The form of risk considered is variance in price which is 
assumed to include a firm specific (e,) and a firm non-specific 
(u) component. Equation (9) replaces equation (1):
(9) P,Q, = (1 + e, + u) F (L,, K,)




























































































With a range over which constant returns to scale holds, the 
level of labour demanded by the LMF is not determined in partial 
equilibrium. The only variable which can be calculated is the 
capital labour ratio. To simplify the equations we introduce 
intensive notation f (k,) = f < K, / L,) = F(L,,K,)/L,. If there is a
risk neutral investor, the socially optimal capital labour ratio 
gives f' (k,) = FK (L,, K,) = (1 + r) . The fact that the pure LMF must 
bear firm specific risk implies that it will invest less than is 
socially optimal. If it bears all such risk it will invest still 
less. A reduction in the capital labour ratio due to risk has 
been noted in the literature (see Hey 1981 and references 
therein).
If employee owned firms finance investment by selling 
conventional bonds then S( is given by (10) :
(10) S, = (l+e,+u) f (k,) - (1 + r) k|, 
so V( is given by equation (11)
(11) V, = f (k,) - (1 + r) k, - g (a/+a/> f7 (k,) .
V, is maximized when the first order condition (12) holds :
(12) f' (k,) = (1 + r) / (1 - 2g (o/+Ou’> f (k,> ) > 1+r.
Thus, in this framework, the LMF invests less than is socially 
optimal. If the LMF is financed with industry performance bonds 




























































































conventional firms are assumed otherwise identical in the model). 
If there are risk neutral investors or if risk is industry 
specific and diversifiable, the expected return on industry 
performance bonds will be given by r.
It is optimal for l,MFs to sell enough industry
performance bonds to hedge all firm non-specific risk, so the 
expected payment is F(L,,K,) and the risk neutral investor(s) are 
willing to pay F (L,, K,/(1 + r) . The LMF invests K( and saves the 
remainder. S, is given by equation (13):
(13) S, = (1 + e, + u)f(k|) - (1 + u) f (kj) + f (k,) - (l + r)k,
which is easily simplified to equation (14)
(14) S, = ( 1 + e,) f (k,) - (1 + r) k.
Clearly, since the LMF bears only firm specific risk it will 
invest more than it would if it were financed with conventional 
bonds. But since it must bear some risk, it will still 
underinvest given the existence of risk neutral investors.
More formally V, is given by equation (15) :
(15) V, = f (k, ) - ( 1 + r ) k, - go/f'lk,),
which is maximized when the first order condition 16 holds




























































































Investment is still less than socially optimal but is higher than 
it would be if the firm were financed with conventional bonds. 
If all risk is firm-nonspecific industry average performance 
bonds will guarantee LMF members a riskless income and socially 
optimal capital labour ratios (indicating that these bonds are 
optimal debt/insurance instruments).
If employee owned firms are required to sell only enough 
industry performance bonds to finance their investment, they will 
have to bear some of the non firm specific risk as well. This 
will cause them to invest less than if not restricted but more 
than if they financed investment with conventional bonds.
In contrast if LMFs sold some simple performance bonds, 
(McCain, 1977), they would avoid bearing some of the firm 
specific risk. Even risk neutral investors would consider the 
inefficient effort and other moral hazard problems caused by 
their bearing some of firm specific risk. Therefore the members 
of the firm would have to bear the cost of the inefficiency. 
Nonetheless, selling some simple performance bonds would reduce 
the risk they bear and increase the optimal capital labour ratio. 
If the firm sold enough simple performance bonds to avoid all 
firm specific risk, members would have no incentive to work at 
all, which would presumably cause the value of the bonds to 
collapse to zero. This demonstrates by contradiction that LMFs 
must bear at least some firm specific risk.
Industry performance bonds enable LMFs to avoid bearing firm 
non-specific risk. Because of potential moral hazard problems 
LMFs must bear some firm specific risk. This may cause 




























































































of membership in the firm. Any efficiency advantages of LMFs 
including possible non-pecuniary amenities might or might not 
outweigh this cost; presumably the balance of benefits will 
depend on such factors as the degree of risk, the optimal 
capitalization per worker, the optimal labour force size, and the 
extent of LMF productivity advantages (for a survey see Blinder, 
1990) .
IV. Uncertainty Resolved Before Employment Decisions Are Made
In this section we consider an alternative scenario in which 
K but not L is chosen in period zero.
For simplicity, we initially assume that there is no firm- 
specific risk. Now, p is revealed in period one, it is the same 
for all firms in the industry, and then L is chosen and goods are 
produced and sold at p, indexed bonds are redeemed for the 
contract payment and conventional bonds are redeemed for their 
face value. Investors are assumed to be risk neutral or 
alternatively it is assumed that the risk in pQ is industry 
specific and completely diversifiable.
The labour-managed firms attempt to maximize the share of 
revenues to each member, s;
PQ, - B, - pQD, pLi'K,'- - B, - pQD,
where Q is value added, B is the number of conventional bonds 
sold by the LMF and D is the number of industry average 




























































































In period zero the LMF faces a budget constraint, they can 
buy capital only by issuing bonds and so:
18) K, - B,/ (1 + r) - D,/ ( (1 + r) „ (pQ) ) <= 0,
where 0 <PQ) is the expected value of pQ at time zero.
To solve the model with indexed bonds we will assume that 
LMFs with access to appropriate indexed bonds will hedge all risk 
and will make the same employment and output decisions as 
conventional firms (this will be confirmed only at the end of the 
analysis.) To see how they might do this we will analyze the 
employment decisions and profits of a conventional firm with the 
production function described above. Given these results we will 
calculate the output and membership decision of a labour-managed 
firm which has hedged all risk and which has the aims and 
constraints described above. First we will guess which values 
of K, B and D are chosen by the LMF. We will calculate L, as a 
function of p, then s as a function of p, then we will confirm 
that our guesses for K, B and D maximize the expected utility of 
members of the LMF.
Since we assume constant returns to scale we can solve only 
for the ratio of B, D and eventually Q and L to K. In a partial 
equilibrium model we can't solve for K. It is determined in 
general equilibrium since p, r and the alternative opportunities 
of potential members are endogenous. We will express all 
quantities as multiples of K. Again, the required expected return 
on K is r since it only lasts for one period and since investors 




























































































In period one the LMF faces a labour market constraint. If 
it hires new members the share per worker must be equally 
valuable as the alternative opportunities of the new members. 
We will assume that new members are willing to join if the share 
is greater than or equal to w.5 In some of the analysis that 
follows we will assume that conventional firms can hire workers 
for w and that there are conventional firms with the same 
production function as LMFs. This implies that counter to the 
arguments above LMFs have no efficiency advantage over 
conventional firms deriving from the non-pecuniary amenity of 
working for an LMF or from increased productivity. This means 
that the best that the LMF can provide for members is a safe 
income of w. New members demand at least w and investors demand 
the same return from money lent to LMFs as for money lent to 
conventional firms or from equity in conventional firms (recall 
we assume investors are risk neutral or that industry risk is 
diversifiable) . If expected pure profits could be obtained by 
conventional firms they would expand until r and w were driven 
up or the distribution of p was driven down. This means that the 
expected income of LMF members can not be greater than w. Since 
they are risk averse they can do no better than guarantee this 
income without risk.
In particular LMF members can not gain more desirable 
financial results than they could get as employees of 
conventional firms. We demonstrate that they can reproduce such 
safe incomes using indexed bonds for example industry average 
performance bonds. This means that even a weak desire to work 




























































































Since LMFs will attempt to mimic the behavior of 
conventional firms we analyze the period two employment decision 
of conventional firms first. We assume the capital stock is 
chosen in period zero, calculate employment as a function of p 
and calculate pure profits (which must have expected value zero) 
as a function of p.
Given constant returns to scale and perfect competition the 
capital stock does not matter, all other variables will be 
calculated as a function of the capital stock. The first order 
condition for profit maximizing is that the marginal revenue 
product of labour is equal to the wage so L, is given by equation 
(19) :
19) L, = K, (ap/w)1/"-*1
Equation (19) implies that 
equation (20):
20) pQ, = p1'"-*’ (a/w)•'"■‘•’K,
subtracting wL, and dividing by 
capital. The expected return 
neutral investors would expand 
until prices changed. This 
expectations are taken at time
21) 1 + r = E( (1-a) p1'"-'” (a/w)'”'"""
nominal value added is given by
K, gives the return per unit of 
must be equal to 1+r or risk 
(or contract) output in the firm 





























































































In particular note that equation five holds only in expectations. 
Since firms must make investment decisions before p is revealed 
they earn returns greater than 1 + r when pn/lal is greater than 
its expected value and vice versa.
This has direct implications for LMFs. Employees of 
conventional firms earn w by assumption. Consider an LMF which 
financed its investment entirely with conventional bonds. 
Returns on capital greater than 1+r imply rents which must be 
shared with new members (which would distort employment 
decisions) . Returns on capital less than 1 + r imply that the LMF 
could not pay each member w. This means that no new members 
could be attracted and the original members of the LMF would have 
to bear the loss (made much greater by the inefficiently low 
employment level) . This unattractive prospect could explain the 
rareness of LMFs. In particular the possibility that new members 
might be difficult to attract makes the problem of risk bearing 
much greater.
Price risk generates pure economic profits which cause 
problems for LMFs. The LMF could use indexed bonds to hedge such 
profits. Such pure profits are value added minus the wage bill 
minus the user cost of the capital employed and are given by 
(22) :
22) pure profits = pQ, - wL, - (l+r)K, =
< (1-a) p1/(,.al - (1-a) E (pl/<1‘‘” ) ) (a/w)""-'1
If the LMF financed its investment with conventional bonds and 




























































































difference between the share of each member and w would be pure 
profits divided by L,.
If instead the LMF could sell indexed bonds and buy 
conventional bonds so that all pure profits were obtained by 
investors the share of each member would be w if it imitated the 
hiring decisions of a conventional firm. The profits and losses 
from producing and selling goods would be canceled by the losses 
and profits on its speculative portfolio.
Indeed given such financial decisions in the first period, 
the LMF would make the same hiring decisions as a conventional 
firm. That is it would admit as many workers as members as a 
conventional firm would hire. The reason is simple. A 
conventional firm chooses L to maximize value added minus wL. 
A hedged LMF which imitates the hiring decisions of a 
conventional firm has value added plus speculative gains (or 
losses) equal to wL,. Any other choice of L, would give lower 
value added minus wL. This means that value added plus 
speculative gains (or losses) would be less than wL, so the share 
per member would be less than w so the LMF would imitate the 
hiring decisions of a conventional firm.
Two questions remain. First how could an LMF sell all pure 
profits to investors that is how could it hedge price risk. 
Second would it choose to do so. The answer to the first 
question is given by equation six. An LMF could sell all pure 
profits by selling conventional bonds to buy its capital then 
selling (1-a) K ( a / w ) b o n d s  which each of which paid p1/n**’ and 
investing the proceeds in conventional bonds. In fact it is 




























































































investors who new that risk in p was industry specific) would pay 
exactly K for this quantity of bonds indexed to p1/ll“al. This 
means that an LMF is hedged if it finances its investment with 
such bonds and neither buys nor sells conventional bonds.
The solution described in the paragraph above is not very 
elegant. A rather neater and more easily implemented strategy 
is to use bonds indexed to the value added of a conventional 
firm. Recall that nominal value added is proportional to p1''11"*’. 
This means that bonds linked to nominal value added by a 
conventional firm have the same distribution as bonds linked to 
Pi/u -.i and therefore the same distribution as pure profits. If 
an LMF financed its investment with bonds indexed to value added 
by a conventional firm it would be hedged.
Since we have assumed that all firms in the industry have 
the same production function and face the same prices all 
conventional firms in the industry would produce the same value 
added (as a multiple of their capital). This means that a bond 
indexed to the average value added by all conventional firms in 
the industry could equally be used by LMFs to hedge their risk.
Finally since hedged LMFs make the same employment and 
output decisions as conventional firms value bonds indexed to 
value added by hedged LMFs could be used by an LMF to hedge risk. 
This means that if LMFs are hedged they can use bonds indexed to 
value added in the entire industry to hedge risk so they will be 
hedged. This argument is as circular as all arguments about 
economic equilibria. It implies that an outcome of a game in 
which LMFs finance their investment with industry average 




























































































that they make the same employment decisions when prices are 
revealed as conventional firms and pay each of their members the 
market wage w with certainty.
The second question asked above is given the availability 
of financial instruments which makes it possible for LMFs to 
hedge risk will they choose to do so. The answer is yes. The 
grim consequences of neglecting to do so were described 
informally above. More formally the argument is that LMF members 
can not do better than provide themselves with a guaranteed 
income of w without earning expected pure profits and the 
assumptions of our model make that impossible. If the LMF
members i buy capital stock K, they must sell financial 
instruments worth K, to sophisticated risk neutral investors. 
This means that the expected payments of those assets are 
(1 + r)K,. Note that this must be true even if the members are
allowed to declare bankruptcy and avoid paying their debts. The 
probability of bankruptcy will be considered by investors when 
deciding how much to pay for the financial instruments. Expected 
profit maximizing conventional firms guarantee that the expected 
return on capital can not be greater than 1+r. This means that 
the expected value of value added minus (l+r)K must equal the 
expected value of wL, or, as shown by equation (23) :
23) E (pQ|) - (1 + r) K| - E (wL,)
New members will not join the LMF unless they are paid at least 




























































































members equation (24) holds
E(pQ,) - (1 + r) K, - E (wLN,)
24)   ^ w
LF,
Equation (24) states that the expected income of members of 
the LMF is less than or equal to w. Since the members are risk 
averse they can do no better for themselves financially than to 
guarantee themselves an income of w with certainty. They can do 
this by hedging all risk with industry average performance bonds 
(or the other assets described above).‘ If they are rational 
they will do so.
To sum up, in this section we have made three arguments -- 
inefficient short run employment decisions by LMF s are made 
because of pure economic profits which current members do not 
want to share with new members, such pure profits can be avoided 
if investment is financed with industry average performance bonds 
and the LMF neither buys nor sells conventional bonds and finally 
that it is in the private economic interests of members of LMFs 
to finance investment in this way.
The results described above are in striking contrast to 
those obtained for LMFs which finance investment from their 
members resources or by conventional fixed interest bonds or 
loans. Previous authors have noted that share maximizing LMFs 
financed by conventional means will respond to changes in the 
price of the good they produce by reducing employment and output 
(Ward, 1958) . This strange behavior has a simple explanation -- 




























































































profits. Current members of share maximizing LMFs are 
disinclined to share these rents with outsiders. Therefore they 
reduce output and employment (membership). This problem is 
avoided in the model described above because LMFs can and (if 
rational) will sell indexed bonds and with them the rights to 





























































































In this paper we have argued that a serious problem with 
financing employee owned or labour managed firms with standard 
performance bonds is that workers would have an incentive to make 
investments which do not add to value added but which do increase 
workers utilities, or simply to shirk. For conventionally owned 
firms, these problems can be limited by shareholders' legal 
authority and especially by the threat of takeovers. To avoid 
such problems, we have suggested an asset which bears some of the 
risk which is out of the control of workers, but which makes 
payments which they cannot affect. In particular, we argued that 
Industry-Average Performance Bonds paying a share of value added 
in the industry have favourable characteristics. Each bond 
would pay a fixed share of value added by other firms in the same 
industry. It would be bought at the market rate. Since the 
payment depends only on the value added by other firms in the 
same industry, workers would have no interest in reducing their 
liability by reducing value added. This asset would enable 
investors to sell insurance against general and industry specific 
risk to fully LMFs. The analysis appears to also have some 
applicability to family-run and start up businesses where owners 
do not wish to relinquish management control.
Use of the index bonds developed in the paper would mitigate 
the well-known perverse supply responses of such firms by 
reducing the variance of economic rent, but only to the extent 
that risk is industry-wide. LMFs might also face firm-specific 
risk. It is necessary for members to bear at least some of the 




























































































choices. Since they bear LMF specific risk LMFs will earn pure 
profits (rents). Their response to LMF specific shocks will 
differ from the efficient response of an idealized conventional 
firm. Depending on the extent to which they hedge LMF specific 
risk (which can not be completely hedged) their response may even 
be perversely signed. Nonetheless industry average performance 
bonds (or the other indexed bonds described above) have an 
important additional advantage since LMFs with access to them 
respond efficiently to industry wide shocks.
In introducing a new type of financial instrument, or any 
innovation in economic organization, the question inevitably 
arises: "if this is so good, why doesn't it already exist?” In 
other words, though the defect is not apparent, the fact that the 
instrument is not in use "reveals" to us that there must be a 
hidden flaw. But new forms of financial instrument are in fact 
frequently introduced; as economic conditions change, new types 
of economic organization become suitable. In this case, it is 
worth recalling that employee ownership has only recently become 
a large factor in the economy; and that the dearth of LMFs in the 
past has limited the potential profitability of innovations in 
that market. There are frequently increasing returns to scale in 
the financial sector. Sometimes, one would hope, economic 
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1. During the first half of 1989, $19 billion were spent by US 
corporations to acquire their own stock to establish ESOPs. This 
compares with $5.6 billion for all of 1988 and under $1.5 billion 
from 1974 through 1987 (Scholes and Wolfson, 1990). Preliminary 
evidence suggests that this trend is continuing through 1991.
2. See, e.g., "A Model for East Bloc Workers: Employee 
Ownership," L .A . Times, June 12, 1990, p.03. "Up for Grabs: 
State Industries," Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1990. "East 
Europe for Sale," The Economist, April 14, 1990, p. 19.
3. An alternative form of the asset would depend on the average 
of dividends paid by publicly owned firms in the same industry. 
A limitation of this approach is that it depends on the presence 
of a sufficiently large number of publicly held conventional 
firms in the relevant industry to provide a benchmark. In fact 
it would only work if the amount of the dividend-based asset 
issued by LMFs were low. If a substantial value of such assets 
were issued, conventional firms would have an incentive to 
increase the dividends paid on their shares. If their 
shareholders also held the new assets this would be a way of 
serving their shareholders' interests. In any case defunding 
competitors is always tempting. The dividend-based asset can at 
most be used so long as the needs of LMFs for capital and risk 
arbitrage are low.
4. For simplicity we assume that default risk is negligible. 
Since bonds are indexed to value added this is relatively 
plausible.
5. If the alternative utility is less than the market wage w then 
the LMF can share negative rents among an expanded number of 
members. It may be shown that for constraints close to w it is 
rational for them to do so by overhedging price risk and by 
increasing output more in response to a price increase than would 
even a conventional firm.
6. Selling (1-a) of value added will achieve this result for a 
Cobb-Douglas production function. Note that this implies that 
investors are receiving the conventional competitive share of 
capital in every realized state. In general, rents can be 
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